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Private Causes of Action Under the Reporting
Rules of the Consumer Product Safety Act
INTRODUCTION
Recently, attorneys representing plaintiffs in products lia-
bility suits have been advised to consider adding to their claims
a count for violation of the reporting rules promulgated under
the Consumer Product Safety Act.1 These rules require manu-
facturers, distributors, or retailers of a potentially hazardous
consumer product to report on the product to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (the Commission).2 Although the
Consumer Product Safety Act (the CPSA or the Act) became
law in 1972,3 only in 1981 did plaintiffs who had been injured by
defective consumer products begin to take advantage of the
Act's provision that apparently allows a federal cause of action
for a violation of the Commission's reporting rules.4 In addition
to providing an alternative cause of action, the use of this provi-
sion allows a plaintiff to bring in federal court a products liabil-
ity claim which would otherwise have no basis for federal
jurisdiction.5 The CPSA's authorization of this particular use
of the private cause of action is questionable, however, and fed-
eral courts have split on the issue of whether to recognize it.6
This Note assesses the validity of the private cause of ac-
tion for a violation of the CPSA reporting rules and concludes
that the cause of action should not be recognized. Part I de-
scribes the structure of the CPSA and the relation of the Com-
mission's rules to the Act. Part II discusses the reported cases
ruling on the private cause of action for violation of the report-
1. See Babij, Industry Fails to Report Product Hazards, TRIAL, Oct. 1984,
at 62, 63.
2. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982).
3. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982)).
4. The first case presenting this claim was Butcher v. Robertshaw Con-
trols Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981). See Babij, supra note 1, at 62.
5. The CPSA-based claim, which normally accompanies other products
liability claims available at common law, can also be brought in state court
under that court's concurrent jurisdiction. See Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
374 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Minn. 1985).
6. See infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
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ing requirements. Part III considers the principles of adminis-
trative rulemaking that clarify the nature and force of the
Commission's reporting rules. Finally, Part IV explains why
recognition of the private cause of action for violation of the re-
porting rules is inconsistent with the logic behind the CPSA
and the Act's relation to common-law products liability
litigation.
I. THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
The CPSA represents Congress's response to the need for a
comprehensive federal regulatory body to oversee the area of
consumer product safety.7 Previous legislation in the area had
been piecemeal. By creating the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, Congress intended to bring the supervision of a
broad array of products under one authority" and to vest that
authority with wide-ranging administrative power to supervise
and regulate the safety of consumer products.9 The Act itself
7. The congressional declaration of the purpose of the Act states:
The Congress finds that-
(1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which pres-
ent unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;
(2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse nature
and abilities of consumers using them frequently result in an inability
of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves adequately;
(3) the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of
injury associated with consumer products;
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks
of injury associated with consumer products is inadequate and may be
burdensome to manufacturers;
(5) existing Federal authority to protect consumers from expo-
sure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of injury is
inadequate; and
(6) regulation of consumer products the distribution or use of
which affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to carry out
this chapter.
CPSA § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a) (1982).
For background on the CPSA and a general discussion of its provisions,
see Lamatina, The Consumer Product Safety Act, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 275-325
(1981); Martel, The Consumer Product Safety Act and Its Relation to Private
Products Litigation, 10 FORUM 337 (1974); Scalia & Goodman, Procedural As-
pects of the Consumer Products Safety Ac 20 UCLA L. REv. 899 (1973); Com-
ment, The Consumer Product Safety Act-Placebo or Panacea?, 10 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 814, 815-28 (1973).
8. In an effort at consolidation, the Act transferred to the Commission
certain functions that had been assigned to other federal agencies under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982 & Supp. II
1984), the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476 (1982), and
the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1982). See CPSA § 30(a)-
(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a)-(b) (1982).
9. Section 3 of the Act defines "consumer product" as follows:
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does not set forth substantive standards of product safety but
rather gives the Commission specific powers to investigate and
regulate consumer products.' 0 The heart of the Commission's
regulatory authority is its power to issue "consumer product
safety standards" dictating performance requirements and
warning or instruction requirements" and its power to ban
products that cannot be rendered safe through the enforcement
of standards.12 These powers are accompanied by elaborate de-
scriptions of the administrative procedures to be followed at
each step of the Commission's development and promulgation
of safety standards.' 3
The Act also contains several enforcement provisions. Fail-
ures to comply with actions or rules of the Commission are
listed as "prohibited acts."'14 Anyone who knowingly commits
The term "consumer product" means any article, or component part
thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in
or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school,
in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption
or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise .... "
CPSA § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1982). The definition then expressly excludes
from "consumer products" a list of items including tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts, motor vehicles, aircraft, drugs, cosmetics and food. See id § 3(a)(1)(A)-
(I), 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(A)-(I).
10. The Commission is charged, for example, with establishing an Injury
Information Clearinghouse, the purpose of which is "to collect, investigate, an-
alyze, and disseminate injury data, and information, relating to the causes and
prevention of death, injury, and illness associated with consumer products."
Id- § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(1).
11. See i&, § 7(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(1)-(2).
12. See id. §8(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2057(2).
13. See id §§ 7, 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2058.
14. The list of prohibited acts reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to-
(1) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce,
or import into the United States any consumer product which is not
in conformity with an applicable consumer product safety standard
under this chapter;
(2) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce,
or import into the United States any consumer product which has
been declared a banned hazardous product by a rule under this chap-
ter;
(3) fail or refuse to permit access to or copying of records, or fail
or refuse to establish or maintain records, or fail or refuse to make
reports or provide information, or fail or refuse to permit entry or in-
spection, as required under this chapter or rule thereunder;
(4) fail to furnish information required by section 2064(b) of this
title;
(5) fail to comply with an order issued under section 2064(c) or
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
any of these acts is subject to civil penalties,1 5 and anyone who
willingly commits any of the acts is subject to criminal penal-
ties.16 In addition, a liberal provision for private enforcement
allows "any interested person"17 to bring an action in federal
district court seeking enforcement of a consumer product safety
rule or of a Commission "order. s1 8 A Commission "order," as
authorized by subsections 15(c) and (d) of the Act,' 9 may re-
(d) of this title (relating to notification, to repair, replacement, and re-
fund, and to prohibited acts);
(6) fail to furnish a certificate required by section 2063 of this ti-
tle or issue a false certificate if such person in the exercise of due care
has reason to know that such certificate is false or misleading in any
material respect; or to fail to comply with any rule under section
2063(c) of this title (relating to labeling);
(7) fail to comply with any rule under section 2058(g)(2) of this
title (relating to stockpiling); or
(8) fail to comply with any rule under section 2076(e) of this ti-
tle (relating to provision of performance and technical data); and
(9) fail to comply with any rule or requirement under section
2082 of this title (relating to labeling and testing of cellulose insula-
tion).
(10) fail to file a statement with the Commission pursuant to
section 2067(b) of this title.
Id § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a) (footnotes omitted).
15. See id. § 20(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1). This section defines "know-
ingly" as "(1) the having of actual knowledge, or (2) the presumed having of
knowledge deemed to be possessed by a reasonable man who acts in the cir-
cumstances, including knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to
ascertain the truth of representations." Id § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2069(d). There
is a maximum penalty of $2,000 for each violation, and a maximum penalty of
$500,000 for a related series of violations. Id § 20(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1).
16. See id § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2070(a). The maximum penalty is $50,000 or
one year of imprisonment, or both. Id.
17. Id. § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073. This section reads in part: "Any interested
person... may bring an action in any United States district court for the dis-
trict in which the defendant is found or transacts business to enforce a con-
sumer product safety rule or an order under section 2064 [§ 15] of this title,
and to obtain appropriate injunctive relief."
In the only reported case brought under § 2073, Plaskolite, Inc., v. Baxt
Indus., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ga. 1980), plaintiff company brought suit
for alleged violations by defendant company of the consumer product safety
standard for architectural glazing materials, 16 C.F.R. § 1201 (1979). The
court dismissed the suit, holding that the "interested party" entitled to bring
suit under § 2073 meant a member of the consuming public, not a company
seeking to protect its competitive position by obtaining an injunction against a
rival company. Plaskolite, 486 F. Supp. at 217-18.
18. That this private enforcement action is intended only to substitute for,
not to add to, the Commission's power to enforce its own rules and orders is
shown by the following statutory limitation: "No separate suit shall be
brought under this section if at the time the suit is brought the same alleged
violation is the subject of a pending civil or criminal action by the United
States under this chapter." CPSA § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1982).
19. Id. § 15(c)-(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d).
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quire a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of a nonconform-
ing product to give public notice of the potential hazard, to
bring the product into conformity with a standard, to replace
the product with a conforming product, or to refund the
purchase price of the hazardous product.20
In addition to these enforcement provisions, the Act also
authorizes private causes of action by parties seeking damages
for injuries sustained as a result of a violation of the Commis-
sion's rules or orders by providing that:
Any person who shall sustain injury by reason of any knowing (in-
cluding willful) violation of a consumer product safety rule, or any
other rule or order issued by the Commission may sue any person
who knowingly (including willfully) violated any such rule or order in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the de-
fendant resides or is found or has an agent, shall recover damages sus-
tained and may, if the court determines it to be in the interest of
justice, recover the costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees
21
The inducements offered to plaintiffs-the prospect of auto-
matic federal jurisdiction and the possible recovery of attor-
neys' fees-are tempered only by the requirement that the
claim satisfy a jurisdictional amount of $10,000.22
It is noteworthy that the private cause of action does not
exist for violations of the terms of the statute itself.2 3 It ap-
pears that the primary purpose of the CPSA is not to establish
20. See id.
21. Id § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Griswold In-
sulation Co. v. Lula Cotton Processing Co., 540 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Tenn.
1982). Griswold Insulation involved a suit brought by an installer and whole-
saler of cellulose insulation against the manufacturer of the insulation under
§ 2072 of the CPSA. The plaintiff sued for monetary damages sustained when
the defendant supplied it with insulation allegedly in violation of a consumer
product safety standard. The court held that the plaintiff as an "intermediary
consumer" had the right to sue under § 2072 and that the plaintiff's economic
injury constituted an "injury" for the purpose of that section. Id. at 1340-41.
Cf. Plaskolite, Inc. v. Baxt Indus., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 213, 217-18 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(plaintiff company denied a private enforcement action for injunctive relief
and imposition of the statutory penalty under 15 U.S.C. § 2073). For further
discussion of Plaskolite, see supra note 17.
22. See CPSA § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982). The claim must exceed
$10,000 unless the action is against an officer, employee, or agency of the
United States. Id.
23. Normally, when a federal statute creates an explicit private cause of
action, it does so for violations of its own provisions, not just for violations of
the rules that may be promulgated pursuant to those provisions. An example
is the Consumer Credit Protection Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982 &
Supp. H 1984), and its provision for "Civil Liability": "Except as otherwise
provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply with any require-
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substantive standards for consumer safety but rather to create
a Commission and vest it with the power to formulate such
standards. Congress has nevertheless provided for enforcement
of certain provisions of the Act, even if not by means of a pri-
vate cause of action. The list of "prohibited acts," with the pro-
visions for civil and criminal penalties,2 gives the Commission
itself the power to seek sanctions for violations of key sections
of the Act.
The private cause of action exists for violation of the con-
sumer product safety rules that the Commission is authorized
to promulgate.25 Because these standards are specific in con-
tent and can be formulated only after extensive rulemaking
procedures that include substantial public participation,26 it is
logical that their violation may give rise to a private cause of
action.27
More problematic is the extension of the cause of action to
the violation of "any other rule or order issued by the Commis-
sion."28 The CPSA authorizes the Commission to develop sev-
eral specific kinds of rules beyond the consumer product safety
standards.29 The bulk of the litigation that has arisen under
the CPSA, however, has not concerned violations of the rules
that the statute authorizes the Commission to issue. Rather,
the litigation has concerned violations of the reporting require-
ments the Commission has chosen to promulgate under section
ment imposed under this part... with respect to any person is liable to such
person... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982).
Because Congress created in the CPSA an explicit private cause of action
for violation of the regulations but not for violation of the statute itself, it is
highly improbable that a court would find an "implied" cause of action for vio-
lations of the statute.
24. See supra notes 14-16.
25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. For an early discussion of
the private cause of action for violation of the consumer product safety rules,
see Comment, The Consumer Product Safety Act and Private Causes of Action
for Personal Injury: What Does a Consumer Gain?, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 115
(1978).
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; Scalia & Goodman, supra
note 7, at 906-27 (discussing rulemaking procedures for developing consumer
product safety standard proposals).
27. It would be less logical to predicate a private cause of action on the
violation of the more preliminary and abstract provisions of the Act itself,
most of which are scarcely susceptible of "violation."
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
29. For example, the Commission has the authority to ban hazardous
products, see CPSA § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1982); to prescribe labeling require-
ments, see id. §14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2063(c); and to require firms to submit per-
formance and technical data, see id. § 27(e), 15 U.S.C.§ 2076(e).
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15(b) of the Act.30 Although the Act did not explicitly author-
ize such rules, in 1973 the Commission published rules in the
Federal Register offering "guidelines" for interpreting the re-
porting requirements of section 15(b). 31 These rules, now codi-
fied at 16 C.F.R. § 1115, specify, among other things, the kinds
of information that must be reported to the Commission 32 and
the timetable for doing so. 33 Violations of these rules, rather
30. Section 15(b) reads:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in com-
merce, and every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains
information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such prod-
uct-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety
rule; or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product
hazard described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, shall immediately
inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such defect,
unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowl-
edge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such de-
fect or failure to comply.
I&c § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b). Section 15(a) defines "substantial product haz-
ard" as follows:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product
safety rule which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the
number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of
the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to the
public.
Id § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a).
31. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,902 (1973).
32. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (1985). The first paragraph of this subsection lays
out the general procedure for reporting to the Commission:
(a) General. Subject firms should not delay reporting in order
to determine to a certainty the existence of a noncompliance or a de-
fect and the substantiality of a possible hazard. The obligation to re-
port arises upon receipt of information from which one could
reasonably conclude the existence of a noncompliance or of a defect
which could create a substantial product hazard. Thus an obligation
to report may arise when a subject firm receives the first information
regarding a potential hazard or noncompliance.... A subject firm in
its report to the Commission need not admit or may specifically deny
that the information it submits reasonably supports the conclusion
that its consumer product is noncomplying or contains a defect which
could create a substantial product hazard within the meaning of sec-
tion 15(b) of the CPSA. After receiving the report, the staff will pre-
liminarily determine whether the noncompliance or defect presents a
substantial product hazard. This determination can be based on infor-
mation supplied by a subject firm or from any other source. If the
matter is adjudicated, the Commission will ultimately make the deci-
sion as to substantial product hazard or will seek to have a court
make the decision as to imminent product hazard.
Id- (citation omitted).
33. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14 (1985). The timetable for reporting is set in motion
as soon as an employee of the company receives information suggesting that a
1986]
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than violations of the consumer product safety rules, have been
used as the bases of private causes of action.
II. CASES ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
Since 1981, there have been eight reported opinions, all but
one from federal courts, ruling on the validity of the private
cause of action for violation of the reporting requirements.3 In
seven of these cases, the courts ruled only on the defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's
CPSA claim. Five of these courts denied the motion, thus rec-
ognizing the CPSA claim,35 but two courts have recently
granted the motion, thus rejecting the CPSA claim.36 In the
eighth case the court granted a plaintiffs motion to amend the
complaint to include the CPSA claim.3 7 A brief review of the
product is defective or violates a consumer product safety rule. Five days after
that time, the Commission's rule allows it to impute the same information to
the Chief Executive Officer of the company. Id § 1115.14(b). If the informa-
tion is unclear or incomplete, the company normally has ten days to investi-
gate and evaluate it. Id- § 1115.14(d). Once it is in possession of information
that "reasonably supports the conclusion" that the product is indeed defective
or fails to comply with a safety rule, the company has twenty-four hours to
report the information to the Commission. Id § 1115.14(e).
34. See Drake v. Lochinvar Water Heater, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D.
Minn. 1985), appeal filed, sub nom. Drake v. Honeywell, No. 85-5179 (8th Cir.
June 5, 1985); Kahn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F. Supp. 957, 958 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. Ind.
1985); Morris v. Coleco Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (E.D. Va. 1984); Payne v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Young v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Butcher v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 698-700 (D. Md. 1981); Swenson v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 699-701 (Minn. 1985).
35. See Drake v. Lochinvar Water Heater, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D.
Minn. 1985), appeal filed, sub nom. Drake v. Honeywell, No. 85-5179 (8th Cir.
June 5, 1985); Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D.
Ind. 1985); Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288, 292-93
(N.D.N.Y. 1983); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 698-700
(D. Md. 1981); Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 699-701 (Minn.
1985).
36. See Kahn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F. Supp. 957, 958 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Morris v. Coleco Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8, 10 (E.D. Va. 1984). In Morris,
the court apparently believed that the plaintiff was basing the claim on a viola-
tion of the CPSA itself, not on a violation of the Commission's reporting rules.
See Morris, 587 F. Supp. at 9. The court therefore denied the claim because
the CPSA provides no private cause of action for violation of its own terms.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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courts' reasoning introduces the main issues raised by the rec-
ognition of the private cause of action.
The earliest case, Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,38 in-
volved a plaintiff who received serious burns as the result of
the explosion of a gas-run hot water heater. The plaintiff
brought state common-law claims of fraud, negligence, and
strict liability against the manufacturers of the gas water
heater and of its automatic shut-off device as well as against the
gas supplier. The plaintiff also added a claim for a violation of
the Commission's reporting requirements, a claim that allowed
him to bring his suit in federal court.
The defendants denied that the CPSA's provision for a pri-
vate cause of action extended this right to violations of the
Commission's reporting rules.39 The defendants apparently
stressed the difference between substantive rules, such as the
consumer product safety rules, and interpretive rules, such as
the reporting requirements, 40 and argued that only a violation
of the substantive rules can sustain a cause of action.41 To rein-
force their contention, the defendants claimed that recognition
of the new private cause of action would flood the federal
courts with products liability suits that would qualify for fed-
eral jurisdiction solely because of the CPSA claim.42
The Butcher court agreed with the defendants that the
Commission had issued two distinct kinds of rules. The court
found that the consumer product safety rules are substantive in
nature whereas the "disclosure rules" of section 1115,43 promul-
gated under section 15(b) of the CPSA, are procedural or inter-
pretive.44 The court did not, however, accept the defendants'
conclusion that only a violation of a consumer product safety
rule could give rise to a private cause of action. Rather, a
straightforward reading of the language of section 23 convinced
the court that Congress intended "any other rule or order" to
include the reporting requirements contained in section 1115.45
The court allowed the private cause of action for violation of
these rules, citing the principle that remedial legislation should
38. 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981).
39. Id. at 698.
40. For further discussion of the difference between substantive and in-
terpretive rules, see infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
41. Butcher, 550 F. Supp. at 698.
42. Id at 700.
43. 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (1985).
44. Butcher, 550 F. Supp. at 695.
45. Id. at 700.
1.986]
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be given a liberal construction by the courts.46 In response to
the defendants' floodgates argument, the court simply observed
that, if more products liability suits entered the federal courts,
this may have been Congress's intention.4 7
After Butcher, four other federal courts essentially
adopted its reasoning and holding.48 The only state court that
has ruled on the issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court, reached
the same result through similar reasoning in the case of Swen-
son v. Emerson Electric Co.49 As in Butcher, the plaintiff in
Swenson added a federal claim under section 23 of the CPSA to
his common-law product liability claims arising out of an injury
caused by a gas water heater explosion. Though agreeing with
the defendant that the reporting rules of section 1115 are inter-
pretive in nature, the court refused to accept the defendant's
contention that an interpretive rule cannot be binding and
therefore cannot be "violated" so as to give rise to a private
cause of action. The court stated instead that interpretive rules
may be binding on a court if the court accepts them as reason-
ably related to the statute they interpret. 50 Because the report-
ing requirements of section 1115 are a reasonable interpretation
of section 15(b) of the statute, the Minnesota court held that a
violation of the rules can sustain a private cause of action.
51
Two federal district courts have subsequently found de-
fendants' arguments persuasive and have refused to recognize a
private cause of action for a violation of the provisions of sec-
tion 1115. In Morris v. Coleco Industries,52 the court concluded
for several reasons that Congress did not intend to create a pri-
vate cause of action for failure to report defective products to
the Commission.53 The Morris court reasoned that the report-
ing requirements are primarily statutory because they are con-
tained in section 15(b) and hence do not arise under any rule or
46. Id. at 699 (citing United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486, 494
(D.D.C. 1977) and cases therein).
47. Id at 700.
48. See Drake v. Lochinvar Water Heater, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D.
Minn. 1985), appealfiled, sub nom. Drake v. Honeywell, No. 85-5179 (8th Cir.
June 5, 1985); Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D.
Ind. 1985); Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
49. 374 N.W.2d 690, 699-701 (Minn. 1985).
50. See id at 701 (citing Production Tool Corp. v. Employment and Train-
ing Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982)).
51. See Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 705.
52. 587 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Va. 1984).
53. See i&i at 10.
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order issued by the Commission, the violation of which would
give rise to the cause of action.M The court apparently con-
cluded that Congress intended the civil and criminal penalties
provided for in the Act55 to be the exclusive means of enforce-
ment of the reporting requirements. 56 The Morris court also
thought it "illogical" that Congress might have believed that a
company's failure to report to the Commission would be the
proximate cause of an injury.5 7 Finally, the court expressed
concern that recognizing the cause of action would convert the
federal courts into a "special tribunal" for products liability
suits 5 8
With the exceptions of Butcher and Swenson, the analyses
offered in the reported opinions have been surprisingly per-
functory. Courts have avoided a sustained discussion of the sta-
tus and legal effect of the reporting requirements of section
1115 in two ways. First, courts recognizing the private cause of
action have appealed too rapidly to the "plain meaning" of the
statute.59 Second, courts denying the private cause of action
have moved too quickly to policy arguments that focus on an
anticipated flooding of the federal courts by products liability
litigation.60
Little attention has been directed to the administrative law
problem of what it means to base a private cause of action on
the violation of rules that are only interpretive in nature.61
The next section of this Note discusses whether Congress in-
tended to create a private cause of action based on the violation
of interpretive rules, and if so, whether its intent can be given
effect. A judgment concerning the effect of section 1115 on pri-
54. McL at 9.
55. See CPSA §§ 20, 21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2069, 2070 (1982); supra notes 14-16
and accompanying text.
56. See Morris, 587 F. Supp. at 9.
57. Id. at 9-10.
58. Id. at 9-10.
59. See Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D.
Ind. 1985) (agreeing with the reasoning and results of Butcher v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981) and Young v. Robertshaw Con-
trols Co., 560 F. Supp. 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), in construing the Act according to
its plain meaning).
60. See Kahn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F. Supp. 957, 958 (N.D. Ga.
1985) (adopting the rationale of Morris v. Coleco Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.
Va. 1984)).
61. Only the Butcher and Swenson courts have addressed this issue, and
both of them concluded that violations of interpretive rules can give rise to
private causes of action. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 50.
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vate litigation requires a brief discussion of some of the rele-
vant fundamentals of administrative rulemaking.
III. LEGISLATIVE VERSUS INTERPRETIVE RULES
AND THE NATURE OF SECTION 1115
A. THE TWO KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
Rulemaking by administrative agencies takes place within
the constitutionally defined boundaries separating the legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive functions of government. The early
view was that a legislative body could never delegate its law-
making powers to administrative agencies. 62 In recent decades,
however, the considerable growth in the importance of regula-
tory agencies has been accompanied by a recognition that cer-
tain traditionally legislative functions can be transferred from
the legislative branch to administrative agencies. 63 Conse-
quently, certain rules promulgated by administrative agencies
are said to be "legislative," or "substantive."64 Because they re-
sult from a valid delegation of legislative power, these rules
have a binding effect similar to that of statutes.65
Legislative rules must be distinguished from other rules
promulgated by agencies, which are called "interpretive" or
"administrative" rules. Whereas legislative rules amount to a
type of lawmaking, interpretive rules embody an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute that it enforces, or an agency's description
of its own internal organization or of the procedures it has de-
veloped for fulfilling its functions.66
Although it is not always apparent on its face whether an
62. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.
77, 85 (1932).
63. See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:9 (2d ed.
1979) (tracing the early development of the acceptance of the delegation of leg-
islative power to administrative agencies).
64. On the use of these two terms as synonyms, see 2 K. DAVIS, supra
note 63, § 7:9, at 47.
65. See, e.g., id. § 7:8, at 36 ("Valid legislative rules have about the same
effect as valid statutes; they are binding on courts."); see also Batterson v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 418 (1977) (discussing an administrative rule promul-
gated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare "pursuant to a dele-
gation of rulemaking authority"). The Batterson court defined the authority
delegated by Congress to the Secretary: "In exercising that responsibility, the
Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not
free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted
the statute in a different manner." Id. at 425.
66. For a discussion of the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of
rules, see infra note 82; see also 2 K. DAVis, supra note 63, §§ 7:5, at 25, 31, 7:7-
:9.
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administrative rule is legislative or interpretive, the two kinds
of rules can be sharply distinguished by the type of the author-
ity under which they are promulgated.67 A legislative rule,
resting upon a delegation of authority from a lawmaking body,
requires an explicit grant of legislative power contained in a
statute,68 whereas an interpretive rule, not involving legislative
power, requires no such authorization.69 The result, however,
is that an interpretive rule has no authority independent from
that of the statute it purports to interpret.70
Although a legislative rule must be grounded in statutory
authority, the statutory grant need not precisely define the
scope of the legislative power assigned to the agency.71 The
statute must nevertheless contain language that confers on the
administrative agency the authority to enforce its provisions. If
such language is absent, any rules promulgated under the stat-
ute must be interpretive. The converse, however, is not always
true: the mere fact that a statute contains a grant of legislative
power to an agency does not mean that all rules promulgated
by that agency must be legislative. If the agency has intended
to promulgate them as interpretive rules, that intent may
govern.72
The distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is
67. As Professor Kenneth Davis has written: "The question whether a
rule is legislative or interpretive thus depends upon whether or not it is issued
pursuant to a grant of lawmaking power." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 63, § 7:10, at
52.
68. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 63, § 7:8, at 36; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW § 56, at 148-49 (1976).
69. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 63, §§ 7:8, at 36.
70. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 63, §§ 7:8-:11 (distinguishing be-
tween legislative and interpretive rules in the context of the historical back-
ground, major cases, current law, and democratic theory). The case
establishing the non-binding effect of interpretive rules is Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (holding that because the Fair Labor Standards
Act gave no general rulemaking power to its Administrator, the opinions he
published were interpretive only and not binding on the courts).
71. As Professor Davis states: "The statutory grant of power may be spe-
cific and clear, or it may be broad, general, vague and uncertain." 2 K. DAVIS,
supra note 63, §7:11, at 54.
72. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, §5:03, at 148
(1976). Professor Davis has stated.
When [an agency] has the delegated power, its rules may be either
legislative or interpretive, depending on which kind of rules the
agency intends to make. An agency with the power to make both
kinds of rules necessarily has authority to determine which kind it is
making, and the best evidence of its intent is what it says when it is-
sues the rules.
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acknowledged in the Administrative Procedure Act (the
APA). 73 Only legislative rules are subject to either the infor-
mal ("notice and comment") or the formal procedures that pre-
cede the promulgation of rules;74 interpretive rules are exempt
from all such procedures.7 5 The procedures outlined in the
APA constitute a set of minimum requirements for legislative
rules issued by all federal administrative agencies; stricter pro-
cedural requirements can be set by the statutes that create and
empower specific agencies.7 6 Thus, if an agency promulgates
rules without having followed either the formal or the informal
procedures for rulemaking established by the APA, those rules
are necessarily interpretive. Once again, however, the converse
is not always true: an agency may, if it wishes, adopt notice and
comment procedures when proposing interpretive rules without
thereby converting them into legislative rules.77
The distinction between the two kinds of rules is crucial
for the purposes of judicial review and enforcement. Legisla-
tive rules are binding upon courts to the same degree as the
statutes to which those rules seek to give substance. 78 Interpre-
tive rules, though they are usually entitled to deference from a
court, can never have a binding effect upon the court.7 9 An im-
portant consequence is that there can be no violation of an in-
terpretive rule per se; what appears to be a violation of an
interpretive rule is in fact a violation of the underlying statute,
or indeed no violation at all if the court decides that the rule
was an erroneous interpretation of the statute.
In light of these principles of administrative rulemaking,
73. See APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
74. See id §§ 4, 5, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554.
75. Section 4(b) of the APA states in relevant part: "Except when notice
or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-(A) to inter-
pretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice... ." Id § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
76. For example, CPSA §§ 7 and 8 prescribe special procedures for the de-
velopment of consumer product safety rules that exceed the basic require-
ments of the APA. See CPSA §§ 7, 8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2057 (1982). For
discussion of the CPSA's procedural requirements, see Scalia & Goodman,
supra note 7, at 906-22.
77. This is the procedure the Commission adopted while developing the
reporting requirements contained in 16 C.F.R. § 1115. See infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
78. As the Supreme Court stated in Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425
(1977): "A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations [i.e., regu-
lations "with legislative effect"] simply because it would have interpreted the
statute in a different manner."
79. See id. at 425 n.9. The Court stated: "By way of contrast, a court is
not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation." Id
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the creation of a private cause of action for a violation of the
reporting rules promulgated by the Commission as section 1115
is more problematic than might first appear from the language
of the Act. As was discussed previously,80 many courts have
been impressed by the "plain meaning" of section 23 which cre-
ates a private cause of action for a violation of "a consumer
product safety rule, or any other rule or order issued by the
Commission."8' These courts have read the language of section
23 as creating a private cause of action for violations of inter-
pretive as well as of substantive rules; they have thus held sec-
tion 1115, whether interpretive or substantive, to sustain a
cause of action.82 This result proves anomalous, however, if
section 1115 consists of merely interpretive rules. It is neces-
sary to reconcile section 23's creation of a private cause of ac-
tion with the principle of administrative law that states that
there can be no violation, and, by extension, no private cause of
action for a violation, of an interpretive rule. It is thus crucial
to determine whether the provisions of section 1115 as promul-
gated by the Commission are substantive or interpretive rules.
B. SECTION 1115 As AN INTERPRETIVE RULE
An examination of section 1115, its history, and its relation
to the statutory section under which it was promulgated reveals
that it is an interpretive rule. Section 15(b) of the CPSA, under
which section 1115 was promulgated, contains no grant of legis-
lative power to the Commission.8 3 In addition, the Commission
itself has labeled section 1115 an interpretive rule.84
The CPSA contains no general grant of lawmaking author-
ity to the Commission. In this respect, it differs from many
80. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
81. CPSA § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
82. This sweeping construction of "rule or order" finds support in the
APA's definition of "rule": "'Rule' means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. .. ." APA § 2(c), 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4) (1982) (emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that the APA
says nothing about causes of action founded on the violation of rules. Further-
more, § 23 of the CPSA creating the private cause of action for violations of
the Commission's rules or orders makes no reference to the APA definition of
"rule," see CPSA § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), nor does the CPSA as a whole.
Thus it is not certain that the APA's definition of "rule" as including interpre-
tive rules should be read into the word "rule" in § 23 of the CPSA.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89 and text following note 89.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
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other federal statutes that establish commissions or agencies to
enforce their provisions.8 5 Rather than conveying a general
grant of power to the Commission, the Act confers specific, lim-
ited powers in several of its sections. For example, section 7 of
the Act authorizes the Commission to issue consumer product
safety rules, 6 and section 8 authorizes the Commission to ban
hazardous products that cannot be rendered safe through com-
pliance with safety rules.87 Sections 15(c) and (d) also contain
specific grants of power to the Commission.88 Conversely, sec-
tion 15(b), the section under which the Commission promul-
gated its own section 1115, contains no grant of lawmaking
authority.8 9
The grant of power in the sections immediately following
section 15(b) and in other sections of the Act underscores the
absence of such a grant in section 15(b) itself, an absence that
must be considered intentional. This necessarily implies that
the reporting requirements of section 15(b) are exclusively stat-
utory in nature and are not intended to be supplemented by
regulatory requirements fixed by the Commission. This asser-
tion does not mean that the Commission is unable to issue in-
terpretive rules announcing its reading of the requirements of
section 15(b), as it in fact has done. It does mean, however, that
those rules must be read only as an interpretation of the re-
quirements already imposed by the statute, and not as the im-
position of a new set of legislative requirements.
Moreover, the Commission has acknowledged that the
85. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982) (the act establishing the Federal
Trade Commission). Section 46(g) gives the Federal Trade Commission the
power to "make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the pro-
visions of this subchapter [§§ 41-58]." Id § 46(g). Such language, though it
confers only a general rulemaking power, is now construed as granting a
power to make legislative rules. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding the
FTC's authority to make legislative rules), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974);
Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Pol-
icy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 561 (1977).
86. See CPSA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1982).
87. See id. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2057.
88. See id. § 15(c)-(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d). These subsections outline
the procedures the Commission must follow before issuing an order to a man-
ufacturer, distributor, or retailer to give notice to the general public or to spe-
cific purchasers of a defective product of the hazard the product represents, to
repair the product, to replace it, or to refund its purchase price. Any such or-
der must be preceded by a formal hearing of the kind defined in APA § 5, 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1982). The cross-reference to this section of the APA is found in
the CPSA at CPSA § 15(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(f) (1982).
89. For the text of § 15(b), see supra note 30.
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rules it has promulgated as section 1115 are interpretive. When
the Commission first proposed rules under the Act's reporting
requirements, it stated that its rules would "provid[e] guide-
lines for compliance with section 15(b) of the [CPSA]." 90 In re-
vising the "guidelines" in 1975 and 1977,91 the Commission
followed the notice and comment steps which comprise the in-
formal rulemaking procedures under the APA.92 The fact that
an agency follows notice and comment procedures, however,
does not convert its rules into legislative ones. 93 In the 1977 re-
vision, the Commission stated that it would begin to impose
sanctions for violations of its rules.94 In response to this an-
nouncement, some commentators complained that the imposi-
tion of sanctions for violations would amount to giving the new
rules a legislative, binding effect.9 5 After this complaint the
Commission backed down, removed the threat of sanctions, and
clarified the nature of the rules it was promulgating. In a writ-
ten comment, the Commission stated that it had "considered
the difference between promulgating the rule as substantive or
interpretive . . . and [had] decided to promulgate the rule as
interpretive."96
This comment by the Commission offers important clarifi-
cation but is misleading in one respect. By stating that it had
"decided" to promulgate the rules as interpretive, the Commis-
sion implied that it could have chosen to promulgate them as
90. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,902 (1973).
91. 42 Fed. Reg. 46,720 (1977); 40 Fed. Reg. 30,936 (1975).
92. See APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Presumably, the Commis-
sion has elected to use notice and comment procedures for its rules governing
reporting requirements to remain consistent with the general policy of the
CPSA, which emphasizes public comment and participation in the rulemaking
process beyond what the APA demands. On the CPSA's procedural require-
ments for rulemaking, see Scalia & Goodman, supra note 7, at 906-27. In fact,
many federal agencies routinely use notice and comment procedures when
promulgating interpretive rules. See Asimow, supra note 85, at 529.
94. See 42 Fed. Reg. 46,722 (1977).
95. See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,990 (1978).
96. I& The Commission went on to explain the difference in effect be-
tween legislative and interpretive rules:
A substantive rule has the force and effect of law. Thus, a viola-
tion of a substantive rule issued under the CPSA is equivalent to a
violation of the CPSA. In contrast, an interpretive rule offers gui-
dance as to what a law means, but does not itself have the force and
effect of law. A violation of an interpretive rule is not necessarily a
violation of law; the failure to comply with an interpretive rule is a
violation of the law under which it is issued only if the rule reason-
ably interprets that law.
I& (emphasis in original).
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legislative. In fact, the Commission had no legislative power to
promulgate legislative rules relating to the requirements of sec-
tion 15(b). 97
Significantly, the occasion for the Commission's labeling
the rules as interpretive involved a decision whether it could
impose sanctions for violations of the rules. This question is
analogous to that of whether a private cause of action can be
based on a violation of those rules. The Commission's conclu-
sion that it could not properly apply sanctions for violations of
the interpretive rules suggests the parallel conclusion that a vi-
olation of those rules could not sustain a private cause of action.
Under different circumstances a court need not always ac-
cept as controlling an agency's labeling of its rules. The court
may reject the agency's label, however, only when the agency
has a legislative grant of power in the first place, so that there
is a possible ambiguity as to whether the rules it subsequently
promulgates are legislative or interpretive.9 8 Even in these cir-
cumstances, courts accept the agency's own characterization of
its rules as interpretive unless the label betokens an attempt
by the agency to circumvent the notice and comment proce-
dures required by the APA for substantive rules.99
Once the Commission has publicly labeled its rules as in-
terpretive, only confusion would result if a court relabeled
them as legislative. A party potentially affected by the report-
ing requirements of section 1115 is entitled to rely on the Com-
mission's description of them as interpretive and the
concomitant implication that violation of those rules in them-
97. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d
Cir. 1972) (rejecting an agency's labeling of its own rule as interpretive and
holding that the rule was invalid as a substantive rule because the agency had
not followed notice and comment procedures before promulgating it). Cf
American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1343-48 (11th Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2458 (1984) (upholding certain rules
issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission as valid interpretive rules but
striking down one rule for the Commission's failure to comply with notice and
comment procedures before issuing it); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1565, 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding as a valid interpretive rule
an Environmental Protection Agency regulation requiring the recall of all
automobiles of a certain class, against a challenge that the rule was in fact a
legislative rule that had been promulgated without the requisite notice and
comment procedures), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2153 (1985).
99. As Professor Davis explains: "If [the agency] says: 'We intend these
rules to be interpretative, even though we are using notice and comment pro-
cedures,' what the agency does depends upon what it says." K. DAvIs, supra
note 72, § 5.03, at 148.
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selves could not give rise to sanctions. If a court reversed this
description and gave the rules legislative effect, it would expose
such a party to unforeseeable liability.
The conclusion that the Commission's section 1115 is an in-
terpretive rule and therefore cannot be violated in such a way
as to give rise to a private cause of action 0 0 must still be recon-
ciled with the "plain language" meaning that several courts
have found in section 23 of the Act. Those courts read the lan-
guage creating a cause of action for "violation of a consumer
product safety rule, or any other rule or order issued by the
Commission"''1 as including interpretive rules like section
1115.102 These courts, however, have overlooked the word "vio-
lation," which the phrase "any other rule or order" modifies. If
one can impute to Congress the knowledge that an interpretive
rule cannot be violated, then by "any other rule or order" Con-
gress must have meant only legislative rules and orders, the
only rules capable of violation. 0 3 This conclusion is at least
consistent with the legislative history of section 23.104 The con-
clusion that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of
action for violation of the Commission's reporting requirements
100. For this argument, see Appellant's Brief at 13-23, Drake v. Honeywell,
Inc., No. 85-5179 (8th Cir., appeal filed June 5, 1985).
101. CPSA § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
102. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text and text following note
79.
104. The section of the law creating the private cause of action, the present
§ 23(a), is the subject of some discussion in the committee reports and floor
debates. The debates, committee reports, and texts of the bills that passed
through the Senate and the House on their way to becoming the CPSA are
conveniently assembled in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACr-TEXr, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY app. (1973).
In the original House bill, the grant of the private cause of action was
phrased more narrowly than in § 23 of the Act as ultimately enacted. A pri-
vate cause of action was provided for death, injury, or illness resulting from
the failure of a consumer product to comply with a consumer product safety
rule or for "failure to comply with an order under section 15(c) or section
15(d)." H.R. 15,003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §23(a)(2), 118 CONG. REc. 31,409 (1972).
Consumer product safety rules and orders under § 15(c) and § 15(d) were
clearly intended to have legislative force because they were expressly author-
ized by the terms of the statute. Section 15(c) and § 15(d) orders would of
course be issued only after a possible product hazard came to the knowledge of
the Commission, whether through a § 15(b) report filed by a manufacturer,
distributor, or retailer of the product or through another channel. By provid-
ing for a private cause of action only for a violation of such rules or orders, the
House bill clearly did not intend to create liability for a company's failure to
comply with the reporting requirement that arose earlier. The report of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that accompanied the
bill was equally explicit in limiting the private cause of action to violations of
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is reinforced by an examination of the relation of the private
cause of action created by the CPSA to the existing common-
law causes of action in the products liability area.
IV. THE RELATION OF THE CPSA TO COMMON-LAW
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
Section 23 of the Act, after providing for the private cause
of action, states: "The remedies provided for in this section
shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies
provided by common law or under Federal or State law."'-0 5 By
granting a private cause of action for the violation of substan-
tive rules promulgated under the CPSA, Congress showed its
consumer products safety rules or of § 15(c) and § 15(d) orders. See H.R. REP.
No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1972).
After the original House bill, the language granting the private cause of
action became more inclusive. The Senate version of § 23, which was subse-
quently adopted by the House, allowed a private cause of action for a violation
of "a consumer product safety standard, regulation, or order." S. 3419, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 316(d)(2), 118 CoNG. REc. 21,911 (1972) (emphasis added).
Moreover, when the final bill emerged from the Conference Committee, it
contained the still broader language of the current § 23, granting a private
cause of action for "violation of a consumer product safety rule, or any other
rule or order issued by the Commission." CPSA § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a)
(1982) (emphasis added).
These changes in terminology apparently indicate an intention to expand
the scope of the private cause of action. The discussion that might be expected
to accompany a significant alteration of the provisions of the bill is, however,
lacking from the record. The debate on the floor of the Senate that preceded
that chamber's passage of the bill contains no reference at all to the provision
for a private cause of action. See 118 CONG. REc. 21,846-903 (1972). When the
compromise bill emerged from the Conference Committee, the revised provi-
sion for a private cause of action in § 23 did receive some attention during the
House debate. Most of this attention focused, however, on the $10,000 jurisdic-
tional amount now required for private lawsuits and the effect this require-
ment would have on the volume of litigation in the federal courts. Nothing
was said about the scope of the new language, "any other rule or order," that
had emerged from the Conference Committee. Insofar as House members did
reflect on the scope of the private cause of action, their attention seems to
have been directed only to violations of consumer product safety rules as the
basis for the cause of action. See 118 CONG. REc. 31,383-84 and 31,402-03 (1972),
reprinted in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAiRS, supra, at 263-64, 281-83.
Thus the evidence presented by the legislative history is inconclusive. The
language of the earliest House bill suggests an intention not to create a private
cause of action for violations of rules promulgated under § 15(b) reporting re-
quirements. The shift toward the more inclusive terms of the ultimate § 23 of
the Act might normally imply a corresponding intent to expand the grounds of
the cause of action, but the lack of explanation accompanying the new lan-
guage makes it hazardous to ascribe any particular intention to the emenda-
tions of the bill.
105. CPSA § 23(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1982).
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willingness to expand the amount of products liability litigation
in the federal courts. It is equally clear, however, that Con-
gress expected most of this litigation to arise from violations of
consumer product safety standards, the most significant sub-
stantive rules it authorized the Commission to issue.10 6 Al-
lowing damages for the violation of such a standard is
consistent with the doctrine of strict liability in the consumer
products area.10 7 The Commission's decision that a consumer
product safety rule is necessary to eliminate a risk of injuryL 8
provides the grounds for imposing strict liability on a defendant
who has violated an existing safety rule.
If, however, a private cause of action were allowed for a vi-
olation of the substantial hazard reporting requirement, the
federal Act would encroach on the states' common law of prod-
ucts liability in a confusing and unproductive way. Large num-
bers of products liability plaintiffs could gain federal
jurisdiction by adding a claim for violation of the Commission's
reporting requirements to their complaints. Once in federal
court, the plaintiffs would proceed to litigate their state-law
claims under the court's pendent jurisdiction. 0 9 In fact, plain-
106. Although it is not part of the legislative history, it is interesting that
most of the early commentators writing on the CPSA also interpreted the pri-
vate cause of action as one that would essentially be limited to violations of
consumer product safety rules, and, at most, to orders under § 15(c) and§ 15(d). See, e.g., W. KIMBLE, FEDERAL CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFrrY ACT § 345,
at 270 (1975). Professor Kimble stated, in commenting on the § 23 require-
ment of a "knowing" violation of a rule or order
A plaintiff need not establish actual knowledge on the part of the de-
fendant, if he is able to demonstrate that the defendant, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have known that the product failed to
comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule, or that there
was a failure to comply with an order of the Commission under § 15.
Id (emphasis added).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) reads, in pertinent
part: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty .... " Comment (a) to § 402A states in part: '"his Section states a special
rule applicable to sellers of products. The rule is one of strict liability, making
the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product." I& § 402(A)
comment (a); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 677-724
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (setting forth development of current rule of strict
liability for sale of defective products).
108. See CPSA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1982).
109. The federal courts that have so far recognized the validity of the claim
under the CPSA have assumed that the common-law claims could also be liti-
gated in federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. One federal
court that has rejected the federal claim for violation of the reporting require-
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tiffs would prevail, if at all, on their state claims, because the
CPSA claim would be much more difficult to prove.110
The duty to report is triggered by the seller's receipt of in-
formation that the product has a defect that creates a substan-
tial hazard, or of information that the product violates an
applicable consumer product safety rule. If the information is
of the latter kind, the injured consumer already has a cause of
action under section 23 for the violation of the product safety
rule. In this case, the consumer need not take the circuitous
route of proving that the seller of the product had knowledge at
a given time that the product violated the rule.
In contrast, if the information allegedly available to the
seller was that the product was defective, a private cause of ac-
tion based on a failure to report such information would add lit-
tle if anything to the common-law theories available to the
plaintiff in most state courts. In states following section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,11' courts would allow re-
covery on a theory of strict liability if the plaintiff could show
that the product was defective, without proving that the de-
fendant knew of the defect. Section 23 of the CPSA, however,
would require the plaintiff to show much more. First, the
plaintiff would have to prove that the failure to report to the
Commission was a "knowing" violation of the Commission's
rules. 1 2 Second, and more formidably, the plaintiff would have
to show that the defendant's failure to report was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.113
ments, however, has suggested that, even if it had recognized that claim, it
would have dismissed the common-law claims from federal court because
those claims would not exhibit a "common nucleus of operative facts" with the
federally based claim. See Morris v. Coleco Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8, 10 (E.D. Va.
1984). The result would then be two lawsuits, one federal and one state, aris-
ing out of the same injury. The plaintiff could of course avoid this result by
bringing all the claims together in state court under the latter's concurrent ju-
risdiction, but then the plaintiff would have lost the one clear advantage his
CPSA claim could have afforded him: the right to be heard in federal court.
110. For a discussion of the ways in which liability under the CPSA may be
harder to establish than under common-law products liability theories, see
Comment, supra note 25, at 117-22.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The relevant text of
§ 402A is set forth supra note 107.
112. Section 23 does not define the term "knowing." For the purpose of
the imposition of civil penalties, § 20 of the Act defines "knowingly" as includ-
ing both actual and constructive knowledge. See supra note 15. For the view
that the same definition of "knowing" operates in § 23, see W. KIMBLE, supra
note 106, § 345, at 270.
113. In other words, the plaintiff must prove that, had the defendant re-
ported the relevant information in the manner prescribed by § 1115, the Com-
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It is highly unlikely that Congress intended this result. The
causation issue would require the judicial fact finder to specu-
late as to what action the Commission might have taken if it
had received the information available to the seller of the prod-
uct and what success the Commission's action would have had
in correcting the product or preventing it from coming into the
hands of the consumer.11 4
Congress did not intend to displace common law but to sup-
plement it by giving injured consumers an automatic cause of
action for violations of consumer product safety standards or
Commission orders. It did not intend to multiply hurdles for
consumer-plaintiffs or to preempt common-law actions in prod-
ucts liability in the state courts by a federal cause of action.
If Congress did intend a private cause of action for viola-
tion of the Commission's reporting requirements, it could clar-
ify its intention by making either of two simple amendments to
the CPSA. First, Congress could amend section 23 to extend
the private cause of action to violations of the provisions of the
statute itself, not just violations of the rules promulgated under
the statute, as it now stands. A violation of the reporting re-
quirements contained in section 15(b) of the Act would then in-
disputably support a private cause of action, and a plaintiff
would no longer have to rely exclusively on the terms of the
Commission's section 1115 rules. Alternatively, Congress could
amend section 15(b) to give the Commission explicit authority
to promulgate rules under that section. Having statutory au-
thority, the Commission could then promulgate rules that were
truly legislative in nature, if it issued them in accordance with
the informal or "notice and 'comment" APA procedures for leg-
islative rules.115 By either method, Congress could resolve the
present ambiguity of the Act in favor of an expanded private
cause of action. Until Congress does so, however, a private
mission would have taken action in the form of a § 15(c) or § 15(d) order that
would have prevented the injury.
114. This speculation would be made even more difficult by the fact that
the standard according to which a seller must report information to the Com-
mission differs from the standard according to which the Commission may is-
sue a § 15(c) or § 15(d) order. A seller must report all information which
"reasonably supports the conclusion" that a product is hazardous, whereas the
Commission cannot issue an order under § 15(c) or § 15(d) until it has deter-
mined after a formal hearing that the product "presents a substantial product
hazard." See CPSA § 15(c)-(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d) (1982). Thus, the judge
or jury would have to weigh both standards and consider the difference be-
tween them.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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cause of action for violation of the Commission's reporting rules
should not be recognized.
CONCLUSION
The statutory scheme of the CPSA indicates that Congress
did not intend to create a private cause of action for violations
of rules that the Commission chose to promulgate as its inter-
pretation of the reporting requirements of section 15(b). Con-
gress consciously declined to create a private cause of action for
the violation of the statutory reporting requirements them-
selves, or for any other provisions contained in the statute. In-
stead, Congress provided a private cause of action primarily for
the consumer product safety standards and secondarily for the
other legislative rules that it authorized the Commission to de-
velop. These legislative rules have the status of law and their
violation can properly sustain a cause of action. Yet interpre-
tive rules like those of section 1115, which the Commission was
given no explicit authority to issue, serve only as interpreta-
tions of statutory requirements and cannot create new legal
duties.
The theory that no private cause of action exists for viola-
tion of section 1115 comports with Congress's stated desire to
supplement the causes of action already available under the
common law to products liability plaintiffs, rather than to make
such causes of action more difficult to maintain. If, despite the
evidence, Congress did intend to give a private cause of action
for violations of the kinds of rules the Commission has promul-
gated as section 1115, it should now amend the CPSA to make
its intention clear.
William 1. Goetz
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